Recently many authentication protocols using an extended chaotic map were suggested for a mobile user. Many researchers demonstrated that authentication protocol needs to provide key agreement, mutual authentication, and user anonymity between mobile user and server and resilience to many possible attacks. In this paper, we cautiously analyzed chaotic-map-based authentication scheme and proved that it is still insecure to off-line identity guessing, user and server impersonation, and on-line identity guessing attacks. To address these vulnerabilities, we proposed an improved protocol based on an extended chaotic map and a fuzzy extractor. We proved the security of the proposed protocol using a random oracle and AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) tool. Furthermore, we present an informal security analysis to make sure that the improved protocol is invulnerable to possible attacks. The proposed protocol is also computationally efficient when compared to other previous protocols.
Introduction
Given recent developments in mobile telecommunications and the rapid spread of mobile devices, there is a growing importance of wireless and wired networking services that utilize bygone and current positional information from users carrying mobile devices with location tracking capabilities [1] . Remote user authentication schemes typically verify registered credentials using stored databases. Since Lamport [2] presented the first authentication scheme based on passwords in 1981, various remote user authentication schemes [3, 4] based on passwords have been proposed. However, since a server under a password-based remote user authentication protocol needs to store a verification table, which stores the password to determine the credentials of a remote user, the server arranges for extra storage for the verification table.
Furthermore, several studies have shown that passwordbased remote user authentication protocols are insecure against some attacks, including off-line password guessing or stolen smart card attacks [5] [6] [7] . The problem with passwordbased authentication scheme is that it can be easily stolen or lost and making it difficult to remember on a regular basis. For these reasons, many researchers have presented new remote user authentication protocols that use biometrics. A major characteristic of biometrics is it uniqueness. Other advantage is that it cannot be guessed or stolen. Biological characteristics have been used in numerous remote user authentication schemes [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] .
To design a secure authentication scheme, some cryptographic algorithms are also used, such as an RSA cryptosystem [14, 15] , elliptic curve cryptography [16, 17] , hash function [18, 19] , and chaos-based cryptography [20] [21] [22] .
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Recently, many chaos-based authentication protocols have been suggested. Xiao et al. [23] first presented a user authentication protocol using a chaotic map and claimed that their protocol is useful and suitable for serviceable implementations. Unfortunately, many attacks were demonstrated by Han [31] . To overcome these vulnerabilities in [23] , Han et al. [24] presented an enhanced user authentication protocol using chaos and asserted that their protocol resists all possible attacks. After that, Niu and Wang [32] proved that Han et al. 's protocol is vulnerable against an insider attack. Furthermore, Yoon [33] demonstrated that Niu and Wang's protocol does not resist a denial-of-service (DoS) attack. After that, Xue and Hong [34] proposed an improved authentication and key agreement protocol using a chaotic map to improve the security to some possible attacks. Unfortunately, Tan [35] found that Xue and Hong's protocol does not resist a manin-the-middle attack. Lee et al. [25] presented an improved chaotic map-based authentication protocol, and He et al. [29] proved that Lee et al. 's protocol does not resist DoS and insider attacks. To enhance the functionality and security, Lin [26] proposed a new authentication and key agreement protocol using a chaotic map and dynamic identity. Unfortunately, Islam et al. [27] found that Lin's protocol cannot resist wellknown attacks, and proposed an enhanced authentication protocol. However, we found that Islam et al. 's protocol is still insecure against off-line identity guessing, impersonation, and on-line identity guessing attacks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We briefly introduce the Chebyshev chaotic maps, threat assumptions, and fuzzy extractor that we adopt in the proposed protocol in Section 2. In Sections 3 and 4, we, respectively, review and cryptanalyze Islam et al. 's protocol. In Section 5, we propose an improved authentication and key agreement protocol for a mobile user. In Section 6, we present a security analysis of the proposed protocol. Section 7 explains the functionality and performance analyses comparing the proposed protocol to previous protocols. The conclusions are presented in Section 8.
Our Contribution.
To address the security vulnerabilities in Islam et al. 's authentication protocol and obtain the required performance, we propose a security-improved scheme. The primary contribution of this paper are described below.
(i) First, we prove that Islam 
Preliminaries
We briefly introduce the Chebyshev chaotic maps [28, 36] , threat assumptions, and fuzzy extractor.
Chebyshev Chaotic Maps.
The Chebyshev polynomial (V) is a V polynomial of degree .
Definition 1.
Let be a whole number and be a real number from the round [−1, 1]; the Chebyshev polynomial of degree is then defined as (V) = cos( ⋅ arccos(V)).
Definition 2 (CMDLP)
. Given the two parameters V, ∈ * , the Chaotic Maps Discrete Logarithm Problem is whether integer can be found such that = (V). The probability of E being able to address the CMDLP is defined as Pr[E(V, ) = : ∈ * , = (V) mod ].
Definition 3 (CMDHP)
. Given the three elements V, (V), and (V), the Chaotic Maps Diffie-Hellman Problem is whether (V) can be computed such that (V) = ( (V)) = ( (V)).
Threat Assumptions.
We introduce some threat model [37, 38] and consider constructing the threat assumptions described as follows:
(i) Adversary E can be both a user or server. Any registered mobile user can act as an adversary.
(ii) E can intercept all messages in a public channel, thereby capturing any message exchanged between a user or server.
(iii) E has the ability to modify, reroute, or delete the captured message.
(iv) Stored parameters can be extracted from the mobile device.
Fuzzy Extractor.
In this subsection, we describe the basis for a biometric-based fuzzy extractor that converts biometric information data into a random value. Based on [39] [40] [41] , the fuzzy extractor is operated through two procedures (Gen, Rep), demonstrated as
Gen is a probabilistic generation function for which the biometrics BIO returns an "extracted" string ∈ {0,1} and auxiliary string ∈ {0, 1} * , and Rep is a deterministic reproduction function that enables the recovery of from and any vector BIO * close to BIO. Detailed information of the fuzzy extractor can be found in [42] .
Registration Phase
(i) User selects the identity ID and password PW and inputs these values into the mobile devices MD . MD then chooses a random number , calculates = PW ⊕ , and sends ⟨ID , ⟩ to server over an insecure channel.
(ii) Upon receiving ⟨ID , ⟩, server computes = ℎ( , ID ) and = ℎ( , ID ) ⊕ ( , ( )) and sends ⟨ ⟩ to user by using a secure channel.
(iii) Upon receiving ⟨ ⟩, MD retrieves = ⊕ ℎ( , ID ) ⊕ ℎ(ID , PW ), ( , ( )) = ⊕ ℎ(ID , PW ), and = ℎ(ℎ(ID , PW ) ‖ ( ‖ ( )) and stores ⟨ , ⟩ into MD .
Login Phase
(i) User enters ID and PW into MD .
(ii) MD computes ( ‖ ( )) = ⊕ ℎ(ID , PW ) and = ℎ(ℎ(ID , PW ) ‖ ( ‖ ( )). MD then checks whether is equal to . If this holds, MD executes the following stage; otherwise, MD rejects the login request.
(iii) MD chooses a random number and then computes = ( ( )) and CID = ID ⊕ ( ‖ 1 ‖ ), where = ( ), = ⊕ , = ℎ(CID , , , , 1 ), and 1 is the current timestamp. MD sends ⟨CID , , , , 1 ⟩ to server by using a public channel.
Verification Phase
(i) When receiving the request message ⟨CID , , , , 1 ⟩ from user , server verifies freshness of timestamp 1 and terminates the session if ( 2 − 1 ) ≤ Δ is false; otherwise, server continues the next stage.
(ii) computes 
Cryptanalysis of Islam et al.'s Protocol
We cryptanalyze the security problems in Islam et al. 's protocol [27] . Islam et al. analyzed the protocol by Lin et al. and improved it to support an improved security functionality. However, we found that Islam et al. 's protocol was vulnerable to some possible attacks. These attacks are based on the threat assumptions that an adversary E was entirely monitored through the public channel connecting and in the login and verification phases and that E obtained the mobile device. Therefore, E can insert, modify, eavesdrop on, or delete any message transmitted over a public network. We now reveal further details of these problems.
Violation of the Identity.
Let E be an active adversary who is a legitimate user and owns a mobile device to extract information ⟨ E , E ⟩ and suppose that an adversary E eavesdrops on the communication messages ⟨CID , , , , 1 , , 2 , ( )⟩ between user and server . E can then easily obtain the identity of user . The details are described as follows:
(ii) Using [43] , the adversary computes
On-Line Identity Guessing and User Impersonation Attack.
Let E be an active adversary who is a legitimate user and owns a mobile device to extract information ⟨ E , E ⟩. E can then easily guess the identity of any user and impersonate as follows.
, guesses any identity ID , and then com-
, and 1 is the current time stamp. MD sends ⟨CID , E , , E , 1 ⟩ to server over an insecure network. (iii) Upon receiving the login request message ⟨CID , E , , E , 1 ⟩ from the adversary E, server verifies the freshness of the timestamp 1 and terminates the session if ( 2 − 1 ) ≤ Δ is false; otherwise, server continues the next stage.
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. then rejects the session if ̸ = ; otherwise, server continues the following stage. (v) randomly chooses a number and computes the session key = ℎ( E , 1 , 2 , ( )), and = ℎ( ,
then sends the response messages ⟨ , 2 , ( E )⟩ over an insecure channel.
(vi) After receiving the response messages ⟨ , 2 , ( E )⟩ from server at time 3 , the mobile device checks the freshness of 2 and terminates the session if ( 3 − 2 ) ≤ Δ is false; otherwise, MD then computes = ℎ( E , 1 , 2 , ( ( E ))). Finally, E and "successfully" conclude on the session key . However, server faultily decides that he/she is communicating with user .
Server Impersonation Attack.
Let E be an active adversary who is a legitimate user and owns a mobile device to extract information ⟨ E , E ⟩. E can then easily impersonate as follows.
(ii) Using [43] , the adversary computes = (arccos( ( E )) + 2 )/ arccos( E ), ∀ ∈ .
(iii) When receiving the login request message ⟨CID , , , , 1 ⟩ from user , E computes = ( ) and = ⊕ .
(iv) Adversary E randomly chooses a number and computes the session key = ℎ( , 1 , 2 , ( )), and = ℎ( , , 1 , 2 ). The E then sends the response messages ⟨ , 2 , ( )⟩ to user over an insecure channel.
(v) After receiving the response message ⟨ , 2 , ( )⟩ from adversary E at time 3 , the mobile device checks the freshness of 2 and terminates the session if ( 3 −
2 ) ≤ Δ is false; otherwise, MD then computes = ℎ( , 1 , 2 , ( ( ))), and = ℎ( , , 1 , 2 ). The mobile device next checks whether = . If this holds, the mobile device accepts as the session key. However, server faultily decides that he/she is communicating with .
Violation of the Session Key.
Assume that any adversary E eavesdrops on the communication messages ⟨CID , , , , 1 , , 2 , ( )⟩ between user and server . E can then easily calculate the session key between and .
(iii) E can compute = ( ) and = ⊕ .
(iv) Using [43] , the adversary computes = (arccos( )+ 2 )/ arccos( ), ∀ ∈ .
(v) E can then compute the session key = ℎ( , 1 , 2 , ( ( ))).
The Proposed Protocol
We will propose an improved biometric-based authentication protocol using the fuzzy extractor. The proposed protocol is also two members, user and server , and consists of four phases such as registration, login, verification, and password change. Figures 1 and 2 are the registration and login and verification phases of the proposed scheme.
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Replace ⟨X i ⟩ with ⟨y 
Registration Phase
gives one's biometrics BIO at the mobile device MD . The MD then scans BIO , pulls out two random strings ( , ) from the computation Gen(BIO ) → ( , ), and stores in storage. enters the identity ID and password PW , and MD then calculates RPW = ℎ(PW ‖ ). Finally, MD generates a random number , stores in the storage, and sends user registration request message ⟨ID , DPW = RPW ⊕ ⟩ to server by using a secure communication channel.
(ii) Upon receiving the request message for registration, randomly chooses a number and calculates = ℎ( ‖ ID ), V = ℎ(ID ‖ DPW ) ⊕ ( ), and = ( ‖ ℎ( ‖ )) ⊕ DPW , where is a fixed random positive integer and is the master key of server . , 1 ⟩ for login to server .
Login Phase

Verification Phase
(i) When receiving the request message ⟨CID , , , 1 ⟩ from MD , server checks whether 2 − 1 ≤ Δ is valid, where Δ is the minimum acceptable time interval and 2 is the actual arrival time of login request. If this holds, continues to proceed to the next stage; otherwise, rejects the request. 
Password Change Phase
(i) User inputs ID and PW and gives BIO * into the mobile device MD .
(ii) MD scans BIO * and recovers from the computation Rep(BIO * , ) → .
(iii) MD then computes RPW = ℎ(PW ‖ ), ( ) = ⊕ ℎ(ID ‖ RPW ), and = ℎ(ℎ(ID ‖ RPW ) ‖ ( )) and checks whether is the same to the stored . If this holds, MD performs the next stage; otherwise, MD rejects the password change request.
(iv) inputs a new password PW * into MD . MD then computes RPW * = ℎ(PW * ‖ ),
(v) Finally, MD replaces ⟨ , , ⟩ by ⟨ * , * , * ⟩ into storage.
Security Analysis of the Improved Protocol
The proposed protocol, which retains the advantages of Islam et al. 's protocol, is demonstrated, and it can resist some possible attacks and supports all security properties. The analysis of the improved protocol was organized with the threat assumptions made in Preliminaries.
Formal Security Analysis.
A random oracle-based formal analysis is demonstrated here, and its security is shown. First, the following hash function is defined [44] : Definition 4. A collision-resistance and one-way hash function ℎ : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} receives an input as a binary string of arbitrary length V ∈ {0, 1} * , returns a binary string of fixed length ℎ(V) ∈ {0, 1} , and gratifies the following conditions:
(i) Given ∈ , it is computationally impracticable to find a V ∈ such that = ℎ(V).
(ii) Given V ∈ , it is computationally impracticable to find another V ̸ = V ∈ , such that ℎ(V ) = ℎ(V).
(iii) It is computationally impracticable to find a pair (V , V) ∈ × , with V ̸ = V, such that ℎ(V ) = ℎ(V).
Theorem 5. According to the assumptions if hash function ℎ(⋅) similarly acts like an random oracle, then the improved protocol is clearly secure to an adversary E to protect sensitive information, including identity , semigroup property ( ), common session key , and master secret key .
Proof. Formal proof of the proposed protocol is similar in [40, 45] , and it uses the oracle to construct E, which will have the ability to extract ID , ( ), , and . are the execution time and number of queries. We then discuss the algorithm in Algorithm 1 for E. If E has the capability to address the problem of hash function given in Definition 4, then he/she can immediately retrieve ID , ( ), , and . In that case, E will detect the complete connections between and ; however, the inversion of the input from a given hash result is not possible computationally; that is, Adv In conclusion, there is no method for E to detect the complete connections between and , and the proposed protocol is distinctly invulnerable to an adversary E to retrieve (ID , ( ), , ).
Simulation Result Using AVISPA.
We perform to simulate the improved protocol for formal analysis using the widely accepted AVISPA. The main contribution of the simulation is to prove that the improved protocol is invulnerable to man-in-the-middle and replay attacks. AVISPA tool consists of four back-ends: (1) On-the-Fly Model Checker (OFMC); (2) Constraint-Logic-Based Attack Searcher; (3) SAT-Based Model Checker; and (4) Tree Automata Based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols. In the AVISPA, the protocol is implemented in High-Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) [44] , which is based on the roles: the basic roles for representing each entity role and composition roles for representing the scenarios of the basic Security and Communication Networks 
Call the Reveal oracle. Let ⟨ID ⟩ ← Reveal( ) (8) if (ID == ID ) then (9) Compute ℎ( ‖ ) = CID ⊕ ID (10) Call the Reveal oracle. Let ⟨ ⟩ ← Reveal( 1 = ℎ( ‖ )) (11) Call the Reveal oracle. Let ⟨ ⟩ ← Reveal( 2 = ℎ( ‖ )) (12) if ( == ) then (13) Accept ID , ( ) , , as the correct ID , ( ), , , respectively. (14) return 0 (Success) (15) else (16) return 0 (Failure) (17) else (18) return 0 (Failure) (19) else (20) return 0 (Failure) (21) end if roles. The fundamental types available in the HLPSL are [46] as follows:
(i) agent: it means a primary name. The intruder always has the special identifier .
(ii) symmetric key: it is the key using the symmetric-key cryptosystem.
(iii) text: the text values are applied for messages. They are often used as nonces.
(iv) nat: the nat is used for meaning the natural numbers in nonmessage contexts.
(v) const: it is the type for representing constants.
(vi) hash func: the basic type hash func expresses collision-resistance secure one-way hash functions.
The role of the initiator, user , is shown in Algorithm 2. first receives the signal for starting and modifies its state variable from 0 to 1. This state variable is retained by the variable state. Similar to user, the roles of server are implemented and shown in Algorithm 3. The specifications in HLPSL for the roles of environment, session, and goal are described in Algorithm 4. The result for the formal security verification of the improved protocol using OMFC is provided in Algorithm 5. It is clear that the improved protocol is invulnerable to passive and active attacks including the two attacks.
Informal Security Analysis
6.3.1. Mutual Authentication. Not only does the proposed scheme guarantee security as the other biometric-based schemes, but also and authenticate each other. authenticates by checking whether is valid or not, because only a legitimate user can compute a valid ℎ(ID ‖ ( i ) ‖ ‖ 1 ) using a chaotic map. then authenticates by checking , which only can compute using the long-term key and timestamp 3 .
User Anonymity.
To compromise the anonymity of user , adversary E must be able to compute ℎ( ‖ ). The value is the master secret key of server , and the random value changes every session. Thus, the login request message changes every session. Even if adversary E eavesdrops on the login request message of a user , E does not know ID . The proposed protocol provides user anonymity.
User Impersonation Attack.
Suppose that an adversary E steals the mobile device MD of user and extracts the parameters { , , , , } from MD . To make the login request message ⟨CID , , , 1 ⟩, where CID = ID ⊕ ℎ( ‖ ) and = ℎ(ID ‖ ( ) ‖ ‖ 1 ), the server's master key is needed. Without the master secret key from server , E cannot compute . The proposed protocol can therefore resist a user impersonation attack.
Privileged Insider Attack.
In the proposed protocol, user sends the login request message ⟨ID , DPW = RPW ⊕ ⟩. Even if the privileged insider adversary E obtains these values ⟨ID , DPW = RPW ⊕ ⟩, E does not know RPW and cannot impersonate user . The proposed protocol can therefore resist a privileged insider attack.
Lost Mobile Device Attack.
Suppose that user 's mobile device MD has been stolen or lost and any adversary E obtains it. E then tries to login to server using MD ; however, E does not know the correct password PW . To login to , the biometrics BIO is also needed. The proposed protocol can therefore resist a lost mobile device attack.
6.3.6. Replay Attack. One of the best solutions to prevent replay attack is to use a timestamp technique. The proposed protocol also uses timestamps. Even if any adversary E eavesdrops on any user's login request message and sends it to the server , the server checks the freshness of the timestamp and rejects the request. Furthermore, an adversary cannot compute without ID and . The proposed protocol can therefore resist a replay attack.
Off-Line Password Guessing Attack.
To obtain a password of user , the biometrics BIO is needed. Biometrics is uniquene and it cannot be guessed or stolen. The proposed protocol can therefore resist an off-line password guessing attack.
Stolen Verifier Attack.
In the proposed protocol, a server does not store any information related to the user's identity or password. The proposed protocol can therefore resist a stolen verifier attack.
Session Key Forward Security.
One important objective of any user authentication protocols is to constitute a session key between user and server . The forward secrecy can protect previous and future session keys from adversary E if the master secret key of is exposed. Suppose that the master secret key of is known to E. However, E does not know ( ). Thus, the session key = ℎ( ‖ ( ) ‖ ℎ( ‖ ) ‖ 1 ‖ 3 ) of the improved protocol is still undiscovered to E. Therefore, forward secrecy is retained in the proposed protocol.
Comparison of Functionality and Performance
This section presents comparisons of the functionality between the improved protocol and related protocols [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] , and the computational spending between the improved protocol and the other protocols [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] is also compared here. 
Functionality Analysis.
Performance Analysis.
We demonstrated the computational cost of the improved protocol against previous protocols in terms of the computational cost. According to the simulations obtained in [34] , we found that ≈ 32.40 ms and ℎ ≈ 0.20 ms, respectively, with a system using Pentium IV 3.2 G (CPU) with a 3.0 GB (RAM). According to [47] , the computational cost of the fuzzy extractor technique is nearly identical to ECC multiplication. Kilinc and Yanik [48] has gauged the execution time of some cryptographic algorithms by using the Pairing-Based Cryptography Library (version 0.5.12) [49] in the OS: 32-bit Ubuntu 12.04.1, 2.2 G (CPU), and 2.0 G (RAM). They demonstrated that the cost to perform an elliptic curve point multiplication is nearly 2.226 ms. In addition, they proved that the cost of a bitwise XOR operation is negligible. In Table 2 , we presented the 
Conclusion
Recently, Islam et al. demonstrated the security vulnerabilities in Lin et al. 's protocol and presented an improved authentication protocol using extended chaotic map. Islam Positive random integer generated server ℎ(⋅):
Cryptographic hash function 9 , : 's nearly random binary and auxiliary binary strings : Sessionkey : Timestamp ‖:
Concatenation operator ⊕:
BitwiseXORoperator .
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